THE GENERAL BOARD

United States Forces, European Theater

# THE INFORMATION AND EDUCATION PROGRAM IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

MISSION: Prepare Report and Recommendations on The Information and Education Program in the European Theater of Operations.

The General Board was established by General Orders 128, Headquarters European Theater of Operations, US Army, dated 17 June 1945, as amended by General Orders 182, dated 7 August 1945, and General Orders 312, dated 20 November 1945, Headquarters United States Forces, European Theater, to prepare a factual analysis of the strategy, tactics and administration employed by the United States forces in the European Theater.

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THE GENERAL BOARD
UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER
APO 408

# THE INFORMATION AND EDUCATION PROGRAM

# IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

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# CHAPTER 1

# ORGANIZATION, PERSONNEL AND SUPPLY

## SECTION 1

## ORGANIZATION

1. This is a study of a new organization and a new program in the United States Army.

2. The Information and Education Division was established in the War Department in August 1944, thirty-two months after the United States became involved in World War II.

3. It was established in the European Theater of Operations in April 1945, forty months after Pearl Harbor.

4. As the war went this was a long time for a program to settle on a name. Actually, the program began before hostilities. It began in July 1940, when the Morale Division was established under the Adjutant General, War Department.

5. March 1941, the Morale Division became the Morale Branch under the Chief of Staff, War Department.

6. January 1942, it became the Special Services Branch.

7. March 1942, it was put under the Commanding General, Services of Supply.

8. November 1943, the Special Services Branch was reorganized. Those activities now known as I and E were made the responsibility of the Morale Services Division under the Commanding General, Army Service Forces.

9. Explaining the reorganization, General Brehon Somervell wrote to General John C. H. Lee, 7 June 1944:[1]

> "...I came to the conclusion that we would never have a satisfactory psychological approach to the mental attitudes of troops if we continued the operation in charge of men who were at the same time responsible for physical recreation...We therefore turned over athletics and recreation (Special Services*) to General Byron and proceeded to set up a separate organization (Morale Services Division*) under General Osborn for what we might call the mental conditioning of troops..."

10. The next development, as noted above, was the establishment, in August 1944, of the Information and Education Division under the Commanding General, Army Service Forces.

11. In the European Theater of Operations, the program did not follow exactly the changing pattern in the War Department.

12. During 1942-1944, the program was a responsibility of Special Services under G-1. October 1944, the name Special Services

*Author's additions.

was changed to Special and Information Services.[2] Under a single chief, the activities of Special Services and of I and E were separated into two divisions, each with a deputy in charge.

13. April 1945, the Information and Education Division was completely separated from Special Services and was established as a special staff section at both theater and Communications Zone levels.[3]

14. August 1945, the Division became a special staff section under the Commanding General, Theater Service Forces.[4]

15. In the Army, changes in name are significant.

16. In the case of I and E, they represented the trials, the errors and the progress of a program in development.

17. But changes in name have a serious drawback. They tend to destroy identity. They rarely benefit legitimate enterprise, especially a new program struggling to make itself known, and they are no guarantee of progress.

18. No experienced business man would think of constantly changing the name of his company while at the same time undertaking to introduce a line of products to the trade and the public.

19. None of the names connected with I and E, including I and E itself, have ever wholly satisfied the men responsible for the program. Morale, they argued, was a prejudicial word. So to a lesser degree were orientation and education. Information was inadequate. And Special Services was too solidly associated with physical welfare -- athletics and recreation.

20. What was wanted was a name that would avoid initial prejudice or misunderstanding, one that would catch the favor of both command and the soldier.

21. No one will deny that such a name would be desirable. But in the final analysis the <u>good name</u> of any program is built on its <u>worth</u>.

22. It is a fact that the frequent name changes from Morale to Special Services to Morale to Information and Education were no help to commanders in the field in determining just what the overall program was. Indeed, not one in ten commanders, during operations in the European Theater, could have sat down and written out the complete list of I and E activities.

23. Necessarily, the program as a whole suffered, for the channel of success, most particularly for Information and Education, is the <u>command channel</u>, not the technical.

24. Active personal interest was taken in the I and E program by Secretary Stimson, Generals Marshall and Somervell, and in the European Theater of Operations by Generals Eisenhower and Lee. General Marshall evaluated morale as five to one over materials. And I and E was solely concerned with morale.

25. General Somervell indicated his estimate of the program's importance when he wrote, 29 February 1944:[5]

> "The Morale Services are assigned to the ASF for administration. The Director, however, is

> responsible to General Marshall on Army policy and to me on ASF policy. Where there is disagreement as to where administration touches on policy, the Director is authorized and should be encouraged to come to me or to General Marshall."

26. Again, in his letter to General John C. H. Lee, 7 June 1944, General Somervell wrote:

> "...What we say to troops through all these media (I and E*) and in the Orientation hour, when company officers talk to their men each week, is a matter of daily concern at the highest staff levels..."

27. In spite of the interest taken in it at the top, I and E experienced difficulty in establishing itself throughout the echelons of command. I and E had to begin, grow and serve, all at the same time. Its frequent changes in name added to its difficulties. It had no regular "home" in the Army. It was something "attached". In the European Theater of Operations no personnel was authorized for the I and E program until the receipt in October 1944 of War Department Circular 360, dated 5 September 1944.[6] Orientation officers were found in units arriving from the Zone of the Interior, but these were part-time officers, in virtually all cases, and confined themselves to a minimum of orientation work. Special Services officers were generally responsible for the balance of I and E activities, giving occasional advice to soldiers wanting to take correspondence courses and concerning themselves with the distribution of Stars and Stripes, Yank magazine, Orientation materials and radio receivers. This was true of the air forces as well as the ground and service forces, with the exception of the Ninth Air Force which charged A-2 with the responsibility for its orientation program.

28. The ground forces carried out promptly the main provision of War Department Circular 360, the establishment of I and E in G-3. But it is important to note that these new I and E officers, assistant G-3s and S-3s, were charged with the responsibility for orientation and education only, the remaining I and E activities being left with Special Service officers, assistant G-1s and S-1s.

29. In the Communications Zone and in the air forces, the complete separation of I and E from Special Services was not effected until April 1945.

## SECTION 2

## PERSONNEL

30. Personnel was a complicated problem for Information and Education in the European Theater of Operations. None was authorized at the theater, army group and Communications Zone levels, and at the major subordinate commands, Com Z, levels.

*Author's addition.

31. Grades and ratings were obtained under the greatest difficulty. Tables of Allotment would be approved unofficially and then disapproved officially. Tables of Allotment would be approved for planning and recruiting purposes and then cut drastically. In 1943, I and E was compelled to go twice to the War Department for special allotments of grades and ratings and for qualfified personnel. This was done with the approval and support of Lt General John C. H. Lee, Commanding General, Services of Supply, ETO.[7,8]

32. I and E never had sufficient personnel until VE Day, and never at any time has it had sufficient qualified personnel.

33. War Department Circular 360 brought about a distinct improvement in the quality of personnel selected. In obtaining the services of assistant G-3s and S-3s, I and E came closest to finding the officers best qualified by background, interest and training to conduct the program. But, it should be emphasized that the most serious weakness in the Orientation part of the program was the lack of competent discussion group leaders. Without competent enlisted men to lead the Orientation discussion hour, its objectives could not be won.

## SECTION 3

## SUPPLY

34. In the European Theater of Operations, I and E supplies were involved with Special Services supplies until May 1945. Special Services was responsible for both. Special Services was not a supply service, yet it attempted to operate as one and to some extent managed to do so. After May 1945, I and E organized its own Supply Branch, obtained depot facilities and distributed its materials by truck and APO.

35. Special Services and I and E supply operations were never anything but opportunistic. There was no well laid plan, no well worked out system. Relations with the supply services were never clarified. In effect, Special Services and I and E "shopped" among the supply services or procured supplies direct from manufecturers, and their entire supply operation was generally run on an emergency basis.

36. The unorthodox methods of Special Services and I and E had considerable justification in the beginning. Both services were new, with new requirements. The regular supply services were slow to accept their demands. Established standards of procurement that did not necessarily apply to Special Services and I and E requirements were another delaying factor. The result was that both Services procured many of their supplies direct from manufacturers. Had they not done so, there would have been no motion picture program prior to D Day in the European Theater, no radio program because of lack of receivers, no library service, no supply of orientation materials.

37. Supplies for I and E fell into two categories, those required for the production of I and E materials and services, those received from the Zone of the Interior for distribution in the theater.

a. The first were required for the production of Stars and Stripes, Yank and other publications and for the operations of the American Forces Network.

b. The second consisted of supplies for the United States Armed Forces Institute, correspondence and self-teaching materials; text books, vocational advisement kits, for the command school and university center programs; certain orientation materials including 16mm and 35mm motion picture prints; and radio receivers.

38. All of these supplies may be procured from the appropriate supply services and distribution be efficiently accomplished through regular supply channels.

39. One difference, however, must be made between I and E supplies and normal Army supplies. I and E materials are small package rather than bulk. They cannot be duplicated easily and quickly. Educational books, for instance, take many months to print. A truckload of flour may be lost without serious consequence, but a truckload of text books delivered or lost may mean the difference between a unit school in operation or closed. This important factor must be taken into consideration in the handling of I and E supplies.

## CHAPTER 2

## ORIENTATION ACTIVITIES

### SECTION 1

### PHILISOPHY OF ORIENTATION

40. Orientation was and is the backbone of the Information and Education Program.

41. Its mission as laid down in War Department Circular 360, 5 September 1944, was "...the orientation of military personnel in the background, causes and current phases of the war and current events relating thereto, and for eventual return to civilian life...".

42. Broadly interpreted the scope of this mission was almost unlimited. Who was to say where the background of World War II began and how deep and far the roots of the causes extended? The historian might have restrained himself to tracing the background to the founding of the nation, the economist to the development of power, the clergyman to the rise of Christianity. All three would have agreed that the roots of the causes went deep and far enough to reach under the seven seas into the four corners of the earth.

43. Everyone was agreed that the war was "global", therefore the "current phases of the war" were global as were the "events relating thereto".

44. Last, how broadly was "orientation for eventual return to civilian life" to be interpreted? Was it to embrace international relations, home politics, economics including capital-labor relations, social changes, such phenomena as Frank Sinatra and the bobby soxer, as well as the GI Bill of Rights and Veterans' Compensation?

45. This most important problem of all was never solved. On the contrary the widest latitude was given to commanders. Material prepared in the War Department and in the European Theater was furnished commanders but they were authorized to substitute material of their own.[9]

46. Orientation had immense possibilities. It still has. Potentially, it was the most valuable I and E activity. It still is. What was and is required is a clearly defined doctrine with a governing editorial theme firmly limited to essentials. Orientation, like any other training, needs reiteration.

47. I and E recruited brilliant men from civilian life for its orientation program. Such men as Frank Capra, Eric Knight, Herbert Agar, Paul Horgan, Arthur Page, Arthur Goodfriend made important contributions. Capra produced the Why We Fight pictures, Agar supervised the first Army Talks and himself wrote "The Nature of the Free Man". Goodfriend originated Combat Orientation, created the picture editorials in Stars and Stripes and the two orientation supplements Warweek and Tomorrow. But the ideas of none of these men were joined and developed into a unified and powerful theme.

COMBAT ORIENTATION

48. In the European Theater of Operations, Combat Orientation was regarded by commanders as having value and was more widely used than any other theme. In defining the mission of Combat Orientation, Goodfriend wrote:[10]

> "The mission of the Army is to destroy the enemy. The mission of orientation is to assist in this destruction. Everything orientation can do to prepare the mind of the American soldier for the moment when he meets the enemy in battle falls within the province of orientation. Everything that can be done to strengthen the soldier's resolve to win, to build his confidence in command falls within its province. Fundamentally, orientation is training by explanation. It is a conditioning of the mind. It is not a vague nor academic thing. When successful, it is a weapon. It is a weapon a man cannot lose as he might a rifle, or throw away as he might a gas mask, or forget as he might some detail of training. It is something that enables him to endure the boredom and the anxiety of waiting for the battle. It is something that supports him in the midst of battle. It is something that builds in him the confidence of ultimate victory."

49. Orientation, in the European Theater, attempted to carry out the broad mission laid down in War Department Circular 360. It attempted to fulfill the combat orientation mission. It is impossible to say how far it succeeded.

## SECTION 2

## MOTION PICTURES

50. Most spectacular single activity of orientation was the well-known Why We Fight motion picture series, produced for I and E by Colonel Frank Capra. They were exhibited not only to all personnel of the Army, but to all the armed forces of the United States, to the British forces, to the public of both countries and, finally, to the peoples of the liberated nations.

51. These films were for the most part documentary. They had great conviction. Their immediate influence was substantial and their benefit to the Army and nation unquestioned. Research revealed that 80% of the personnel of the Army liked the pictures.[11]

52. I and E was responsible for two other regular film series, Army and Navy Screen Magazine and GI Movies. Both series were popular with the troops and often preferred to Hollywood B features.

53. In addition, I and E produced films featuring its education program, the allies, the home front. Two notable special features were "Subject: Germany" and "Two Down and One To Go".

54. I and E in the European Theater could have done more with motion pictures. The record of invasion, of liberation and of conquest was made in millions of feet of film. Virtually none of this record was shown to the troops. Much of it was natural material for orientation. Its value to the morale of the troops would have been high. Signal Corps had the production facilities and the technical personnel. Principal reason for not carrying out this project was the difficulty of obtaining approval for the use of the film from the Army Pictorial Service in the War Department.

55. I and E did not obtain full value from its orientation film program in the European Theater of Operations because of two factors: too few prints per subject, lack of projection facilities. Both factors affected the timeliness of the showings, and while this may be of only incidental importance in the showing of entertainment films, it is of very real importance in the showing of orientation subjects. Some troops in the European Theater were seeing the earliest Why We Fight pictures for the first time in 1944. A more positive demand from the theater and better planning in the Army Pictorial Service, War Department, would have solved the problem both of prints and of projectors. Army Pictorial Service did not begin to organize its projector and film library service on a scale commensurate with troop strength in the European Theater until early in 1944. Until the end of 1943, Special Services carried the burden of showing both training and orientation films in addition to its entertainment film programs.

## SECTION 3

## PUBLICATIONS

ARMY TALKS

56. The Pamphlet Army Talks was a development of the European Theater of Operations. It was designed to provide material for the group discussion in the weekly orientation hour.

57. Army Talks was authorized in August 1943 and the first copy entitled "Handbook for Discussion Leaders" was published 29 September 1943.[12]

58. Typical subjects that followed were "War on the Supply Lines", "Problems in the Pacific", "How Lend Lease Works", "Democracy in America", "The British Political System", "The Nature of the Free Man". These titles might have been picked at random from the Atlantic Monthly. The material was of a lofty character for an Army that had only 13% college men, not all graduates by any means, and only 26% high school graduates.

59. In May 1944, Army Talks revised its editorial policy in favor of combat orientation, with the approval of General Eisenhower. Generals Bradley, Patton, Simpson and Lee had all indicated their preference for this type of orientation. The first of the new Army Talks was "The Enemy and You", followed by "These Guys Fought Him", based on interviews with 1st Division fighters who had beaten the Afrika Korps. The third was "Mein Kampf by Adolph Hitler", a digest in Hitler's own words. The fourth, "How Russians Kill Germans"; the fifth "Achtung". "Achtung" was a summary of all available G-2 information which could be published under a restricted classification. It was a digest of the fundamentals the Army had drilled into troops prior to D Day. It was pitched against the background of the beaches and the conditions the invading troops were likely to meet across the Channel. A half million copies of "Achtung" were printed and distributed in the staging areas and on the invasion boats.

60. With the coming of VE Day, Army Talks revised its policy to meet the problems of redeployment and of occupation.

61. Army Talks was first distributed on a basis of three copies to a company, a copy for each discussion leader. When, after D Day, it became evident that few units were holding group discussion sessions, Army Talks was distributed on a basis of one copy to every ten men, so that the subjects could be read individually if not discussed in the organized group.

62. Army Talks faced many problems of production: paper, printing, binding, wrapping. But the most serious was the delaying supervision exercised over its editorial content. Until the Headquarters, Communications Zone, moved to the continent, each manuscript when completed was submitted for approval in turn to the Chief, Special Services, a board of six advisors, including the Commisioner of the American Red Cross, G-1 ETOUSA and the Commanding General, Communications Zone.

63. The board of six advisors was eliminated after Headquarters, Communications Zone, moved to the continent.

64. In regard to this editorial supervision, one need only note that in combat orientation, timeliness is of the essence. "Notes from Normandy" would have only an historical value to the soldier on the Moselle.

INFORMATION BULLETIN

65. Information Bulletin was produced in response to increasing requests from newly appointed I and E officers in the armies, air and service forces for a weekly bulletin on current I and E activities. The first copy was published 17 April 1945.

66. Information Bulletin proved to be indispensable to the I and E officer. It kept him abreast of developments, fully informed. It provided advance information on the next week's Army Talks, analyzed the principal orientation topic. It was a training as well as an information medium. At the request of I and E officers, its printing was increased to include distribution to company commanders.

UNIT STORIES

67. Unit Stories were a development of the European Theater of Operations. They were brief stories highlighting the exploits of divisions and other units. Produced in handy pocket size, they were distributed on the basis of one copy for each man in the unit.

68. Unit Stories were a fine morale factor. They built pride in outfit, sense of accomplishment in the individual. They were extremely popular with both officer and soldier. Unit Stories were printed on scrap paper obtained from Stars and Stripes. Story material was furnished by the unit itself. Units, from the commander down, cooperated wholeheartedly. This was a project that the Army will always be able to repeat with success.

OUTFIT

69. Outfit was a magazine published in the Zone of the Interior. Its mission was to keep the returned soldier in touch with his outfit through news items obtained from the overseas theaters. It was especially valuable in maintaining morale of hospitalized soldiers. Unit news was obtained and edited by the Information and Education Division in the European Theater and forwarded to the editors of Outfit in the War Department.

OVERSEAS WOMAN

70. Overseas Woman was a development of the European Theater of Operations. Its mission was to highlight the part played in the operations and the victory in the European Theater by the WAC, the Nurse and the Red Cross woman.

71. Overseas Woman was a monthly magazine. It was first published in March 1945. It was distributed on the basis of one free copy to three women. In October 1945, Overseas Woman was put on sale in the Post Exchanges. It sold for twenty cents a copy. The acid test of any magazine is whether it will sell. Judged by its sales in the Post Exchanges, Overseas Woman was the most successful magazine handled by the Army Exchange Service in the European Theater of Operations. It was purchased not only by women, but by officers and enlisted men.

MISCELLANEOUS PUBLICATIONS

72. From time to time, the Information and Education Division in the War Department furnished the European Theater with kits of orientation materials. These kits contained the GI Roundtable, group discussion material, Fact Sheets, information on I and E activities throughout the world, and Newsmap. The kits were distributed through APO.

NEWSMAP

73. In theory, Newsmap was a valuable medium of orientation. Maps are pictures and soldiers, like any other human beings, prefer pictures to words. The flaw in the Newsmap program was the time factor. The maps rarely reached the theater in time to have "news value". There is a saying that nothing is so dead as yesterday's news and to a great extent, this saying is true of Newsmap.

74. Because of the untimeliness of Newsmap, the Information and Education Division in the European Theater "shopped" for simple black and white maps which would lend themselves best to phasing in. Only a few thousand of these were obtained and the theater finally procured maps of all kinds from all available sources.

75. Experience in the European Theater has proved that the map is an excellent orientation medium. It is a day by day education, both for the officer and the enlisted man. It gives a picture of the scope of operations in which the United States may be engaged. It is a box score of progress. If there is a map in the unit, there is an orientation program in the unit. There will always be someone to keep it phased in.

76. More than 500,000 maps of all kinds were distributed in the European Theater during the operational phase.

77. I and E experimented with the possibility of a phased map service in the form of film strips. A few hundred were produced in Paris, but this project never went beyond the experimental stage. It is noted here only because it has definite possibilities.

SPECIAL PROJECTS

78. Special projects publications service was a development of the European Theater of Operations. No matter how well an overall program is planned in a theater of operations, there will always be problems of an emergency nature requiring emergency treatment. The special projects service was organized to meet such problems. Notable examples were: morale problems in the replacement system, later called the reinforcement system, problems of rehabilitation and finally the many problems arising out of redeployment.

## SECTION 4

## ORIENTATION HOUR

79. Nothing is learned so well as by discussion. In the free interchange of ideas, men come closest to exhausting their prejudices, increasing their knowledge and strengthening their convictions.

80. In the small group, the most favorable condition for discussion are realized. This fact must never be lost sight of. Any group larger than a platoon makes the discussion a lecture and that is not the purpose of group discussion. Furthermore, in the small group, preferably the squad, the discussion leader can exercise an intelligent influence on the discussion. It is a physchological law that the larger the group, the lower will be the level of the intelligence of the whole.

81. There is of course another reason why the Army chose the discussion group technique as best for its orientation training. The American's passion for discussion is only too well known. At his business luncheons, in his clubs, in the corner drug store, in the country store, he indulges this love of talk daily throughout his life. The Army simply and quite properly took advantage of this passion for discussion. It reasoned that by means of group discussion it would attain most quickly two valuable objectives: a healthy mental attitude on the part of the soldier towards his military mission, a better relation between the soldier and the company officer.

# CHAPTER 3

# INFORMATION ACTIVITIES

## SECTION 1

## PHILOSOPHY OF INFORMATION

82. Information as distinguished from orientation had as its primary mission the furnishing of the news to the troops. By news was meant the same news that was furnished in the free press, on the radio, in the newsreels and magazines.

83. In the European Theater of Operations, information overlapped orientation, to some extent. It did this in the editorials of Stars and Stripes, in Stars and Stripes' two weekly supplements Warweek and Tomorrow, in certain programs of the American Forces Network. Such overlapping was valuable, was never objected to by the soldier, and served the command.

SECTION 2

STARS AND STRIPES

84. Stars and Stripes was an activity of the European Theater of Operations. It was first published as a weekly newspaper in April 1942, and, at the command of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, as a daily in November 1942. Until December 1944, Stars and Stripes was published six days weekly, after December seven days.

85. Whatever the faults of Stars and Stripes, its story is a saga of modern journalism.

86. From a beginning of 5,000 copies weekly in April 1942, Stars and Stripes grew into a newspaper chain of five editions spread over the continent and the United Kingdom with a circulation of more than 1,200,000 daily in January 1945.

87. Stars and Stripes followed the troops. It was variously published at London, Belfast, St Marie Du Mont on Utah Beach, St Mere Eglise, Cherbourg, Rennes, Paris, Marseilles, Nice, Besancon, Dijon, Nancy, Strasbourg, Liege, Pfungstadt and Altdorf.

88. On the continent, Stars and Stripes was delivered free during operations on a basis of one copy to three men. In the United Kingdom, it was sold for two cents a copy during the entire period of publication, and on the continent for the equivalent of two cents after VE Day. On a sales basis, Stars and Stripes was self-supporting. Cost of the free copies was paid for by reverse lend lease.

89. Publishing a growing newspaper, under the best peace conditions, is a business full of headaches. Publishing Stars and Stripes during operations was a fantastic experience, not to be believed by any who did not live it. There were times when the presses had to be held for the newsprint which had been borrowed at the last moment from a startled owner, who fortunately spoke no English. Explanations at such moments are much more easily made in sign language. There were times when one man had to sit down and write the whole newspaper himself. There were times when an entire town had to be ransacked for a gadget to replace a broken part in a printing press. But there was never a time when Stars and Stripes failed to make an edition.

90. If producing Stars and Stripes was a daily problem of overcoming obstacles, so was distributing it. Distribution was made by train, jeep, weapons carrier, two and a half ton truck, transport plane and even by cub. No civilian newspaper has ever attempted to cover the areas over which Stars and Stripes was distributed daily. Distribution men averaged sixteen hours a day behind the wheel in all kinds of weather. The United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany, these were the areas covered each day during the last months of 1944 and early months of 1945. But that was not all, Stars and Stripes also distributed Yank magazine and Army Talks, weekly, with occasional loads of entertainment films for Special Services.

91. Involved in the publishing of Stars and Stripes were personnel, editorial, mechanical, business, circulation and distribution; facilities, typesetting, engraving, electrotyping, printing and folding; materials, newsprint, ink, metal, mats; wire services and equipment; transportation.

92. There is no question that Stars and Stripes was guilty of inaccuracies, of breaches of good taste, of distorting facts for the sake of a clever headline. These faults are all too common to the American press. But this truth does not excuse Stars and Stripes. It does underline the heavy responsibility that rested with its management. A new editorial standard was necessary, one which recognized in Stars and Stripes a powerful weapon of war. The task of the management in establishing and attempting to maintain the new standard was not made easier by the conflicting suggestions received from general officers. Indeed, so many were the suggestions that General Eisenhower found it necessary on 11 March 1945 to direct two personal letters, one to the Chief of Special and Information Services and the other to the Editor in Chief of Stars and Stripes, instructing them that they were solely responsible to him for the editorial policy of Stars and Stripes.[13]

93. Essentially, the editorial policy was this: to give to the soldier a good newspaper, as much as possible like his favorite daily at home, with a good sports page, the pick of the comics, priority in the news of the theater, an open forum in its B Bag, in which he could blow off steam or exercise his sense of humor; to give to command its loyal support; to build good relations with our allies and the peoples of the liberated nations.

94. Everyone has his own idea of how far short of this goal Stars and Stripes fell. Ninety percent of the soldiers read and liked it.[14] Most soldiers liked everything in it. They liked its B Bag. They saw in it proof of the democracy of the Army. Soldiers as much as officers objected to the malicious and petty griping letters that appeared from time to time in B Bag. It was the principle of B Bag they esteemed.

95. Stars and Stripes should have been a uniquely great newspaper. General Eisenhower, who, in the final analysis was its publisher, never at any time imposed a single restriction. He asked only that the paper be an honest paper and that it not undermine confidence in command. Stars and Stripes was uninfluenced by consideration of profit; it did not have to please any advertiser; it did not have to compete with other papers. It had the field to itself.

96. The ironic fact is that Stars and Stripes never had a chance to achieve greatness. The talent that might have brought success was in the Army, but the men who had the talent were not available to I and E. Stars and Stripes had to take the personnel it could get. Only a few of the editorial personnel were newspaper men. None were outstanding in their field.

97. The principal lesson to be learned from the operation of Stars and Stripes in this war is that an Army newspaper in a theater of operations is too powerful to be ruled by anyone but the theater commander himself. Its editor in chief should answer directly to the theater commander. Its personnel should be the top newspaper talent available in the theater, drafted by command decision, if necessary.

98. Two evaluations of Stars and Stripes by high ranking officers in the European Theater of Operations are quoted here. They are by Major General L. C. Allen, Chief of Staff, Twelfth Army Group and by Major General B. M. Sawbridge, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, Sixth Army Group. They are quoted because of their representative character.

a. Major General L. C. Allen evaluated the Stars and Stripes as follows:

"Generally adequate. The effect has been both good and bad. Good in timeliness and coverage of news, in sports coverage and in comic features. Bad in its consistent playing up of minor irritants, in its petty fault-finding, in an apparent bias against command.

"I am of the opinion that the mission of Stars and Stripes should have been to contribute efficiency by maintaining morale. Stars and Stripes could have made a more substantial contribution to morale had it featured the accomplishments of the Army, the overcoming of obstacles, rather than featuring the minor difficulties which are bound to occur in any organization as large as the American forces in the European Theater.

"B Bag could have been constructive. It could have had humor. Many of the complaints in B Bag could not be substantiated. It is important to emphasize the fact that retractions or denials never correct the bad impression made in the mishandling of a piece of news. The solution here is prevention, not cure, since the cure is always inadequate. This requires a very high type of editorial management. I think the B Bag as published was definitely detrimental.

"Stars and Stripes indulged in sensationalism in its handling of the redeployment problem. It showed little understanding of the difficulties that were constantly being overcome in the shipping out of men. It took the news, particularly that which was critical of the Army, and played it up.

"The will of a commander can be expressed in orders. The spirit to carry out orders must be instilled by leadership. In a small command this is done by the personal appearance and conduct of the leader. In a large force, this is impracticable but the effect of leadership is still essential. Personal appearance must be supplemented by use of other means to encourage all echelons and stimulate action through pride and confidence. Radio and the press offer a means of reaching those the commanders cannot see or talk to, and definitely can promote or detract from the respect and confidence in the hierarchy of command.

"Stars and Stripes had the opportunity to contribute not only to the enlisted men's morale, but also to that of the officers. It had the opportunity to support command and especially to support the "civilian officers" in the Army. Instead, it seemed always willing to attack the officer for any failure no matter how small. It tended to weaken confidence in the officer and thus it attacked the whole structure of leadership.

"I would like to conclude this by stating that the power of an Army newspaper has been proved great. It is of the utmost importance that those in control appreciate their responsibility to the commander and to the primary mission -- the winning of the war."

b. Major General B. M. Sawbridge replied to three questions about Stars and Stripes as follows:

Question: How adequate was the Stars and Stripes as an Army newspaper during the different phases of the ETO operation?

Answer: Very adequate during combat; a rather severe decline after VE Day for several months; better now.

Question: What effect did the Stars and Stripes have on the morale of troops under your headquarters?

Answer: Unquestionably great -- difficult to say how great since morale is made up of many intangibles.

Question: What changes would you suggest in the Stars and Stripes?

Answer: None. Avoid letting it become a controlled organ. Regardless of occasional inaccuracies, it has been the enlisted man's vehicle and must continue to be such if it is to be worth anything.

99. These evaluations are worthy of the most thoughtful consideration. Both contain points that are fundamental to the publication of a good and successful Army newspaper. The first emphasizes the need for a constructive editorial policy with respect to command and military discipline; the second the importance of adhering to the principles of a free press. These are not antithetical. A free press can be a fair press, a constructive press. It is entirely consistent, for instance, for an Army newspaper to be fair to both the officer and the enlisted man. The Stars and Stripes, in the European Theater of Operations, has been accused, with extreme bitterness at times, of unfairness to officers. Its B Bag has been called subversive. The Mauldin cartoons have been criticized as anti-brass and disruptive of discipline. The editors have been accused of slanting the news, editorializing, so as to deride and undermine Army authority. The accusations are not without foundation. The Stars and Stripes, written almost wholly by enlisted personnel, consistently sympathized with the soldier's lot, concerned itself with his problems, his sacrifices, his hopes, his aspirations. This preoccupation with the enlisted man's lot was reflected generally throughout the paper. From a high editorial point of view, this was sound in principle. In practice, however, it often led to direct and indirect criticism of the officer.

100. A newspaper is no better than the people who produce it. It must be understood that no newspaper, worthy of the name, will restrict its columns to the display of good news only. News is news, whether it is bad or good. News is made not by newspapers but by people and events. The test of a newspaper is what it does with the news. It cannot, in these times, successfully suppress news of any consequence, good or bad. General Eisenhower knew this when he allowed Stars and Stripes the same freedom enjoyed by the press of the United States. If this freedom was abused, as it was on occasion, the fault lies with the caliber of the personnel producing the paper. The remedy was not to take away the freedom of the paper, but to improve the personnel.

a. It should be noted that the editors of Stars and Stripes, in the European Theater of Operations, were officers. These officers were the final authority on what went into the paper and how it went in. They were in fact the key men on the paper. All copy prepared by the editorial personnel, enlisted men, was published at the discretion of the editors.

WARWEEK

101. Warweek was a four page weekly supplement of Stars and Stripes, published during the operational phase. It was conceived as an orientation medium, dealing specifically with operations. Everything useful to the company officer and soldier learned in combat was told and retold in Warweek.

102. Warweek campaigned against VD, trenchfoot, fraternization, the black market. It campaigned for better security, conservation of rubber and of gasoline. It filled in the background of war news for which there was no room in the columns of Stars and Stripes. It featured the war contributions of our allies and the peoples of the liberated nations.

TOMORROW

103. Like Warweek, Tomorrow was a four page weekly supplement of Stars and Stripes. Unlike Warweek, Tomorrow was devoted to a preview of peace. It featured news of the home front. It began publication at the end of 1944, and was somewhat embarrassed by the Bulge. Tomorrow quickly recovered its poise and went on to explore the "green pastures" about which every soldier was dreaming.

## SECTION 3

## YANK

104. Yank magazine was a project of the War Department. It had the personal approval of the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff, United States Army. It began publication in the United States in 1942. At first, Yank shipped copies of its American edition overseas. But soon Yank authorized publication of editions in theaters of operations. In the European Theater of Operations, the first edition was published in the late summer of 1942.

105. Qualified personnel for the production of Yank in the European Theater were obtained on a temporary duty basis from I and E in the War Department. The material for Yank was produced both in the theater and in the Zone of the Interior. During operations in the European Theater, as much as 80% of the material was originated in the theater itself.

106. Yank was well liked by both the officer and the soldier. It was written and edited entirely by enlisted men.

107. Like Stars and Stripes, Yank printed more than one edition in the European Theater. Yank was printed at London, Rennes, Paris, Nancy and Strasbourg. Yank was distributed free on the continent during operations. The basis of distribution was one copy to five men. It was always sold in the United Kingdom and put on sale on the continent after VE Day. Yank was sold for five cents or its equivalent and was self-supporting. The cost of the free distribution of Yank was born by the profits from the sales in the Zone of the Interior and in other theaters.

## SECTION 4

## AMERICAN FORCES NETWORK

108. The American Forces Network, better known as AFN, began operation in the European Theater of Operations in July 1943. A system employing 50 watt transmitters was organized, the transmitters being strategically located in areas of the United Kingdom occupied by American troops. Program material was furnished by the Armed Forces Radio Service in the Zone of the Interior. News was obtained by short wave, from wire services, Stars and Stripes and the British Broadcasting Corporation. A limited amount of program material was originated in the theater, principally orientation material. This operation was continued in the United Kingdom throughout the war.

109. The American Forces Network program on the continent, by order of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, was combined with that of the British Broadcasting Corporation and the joint program was known as the Allied Expeditionary Forces Program of the BBC. The program was unpopular with many American officers and soldiers, primarily because the news was prepared by the British and broadcast in British voices. No matter how impartial and factual the news might be, our troops did not like it when delivered by British voices.

110. Throughout the history of the Allied Expeditionary Forces Program of the BBC, complaints against it flowed into SHAEF. Nearly all of the complaints claimed that the BBC played up British operations on the continent and played down the American. It was not until VE Day that AFN was authorized to broadcast an all-American program to the troops on the continent.

111. The all-American program was highly popular. Programs furnished by the Armed Forces Radio Service were uniformly excellent. They featured the top radio entertainers in America, including the best bands on the air.

112. American Forces Network varied its service from twelve to twenty hours per day. The service should have covered the full twenty four hours, especially during operations.

113. AFN's principal problems were technical: the securing of transmitter facilities, their erection and maintenance, the securing of studio equipment and of qualified technical personnel. The source of supply and service for all of these was the Signal Corps.

114. AFN's operations on the continent included studios and transmitting facilities at Paris, Marseilles, Nice, Cannes, Dijon, Nancy, Le Havre, Rheims, Bremen, Berlin, Frankfurt, Munich and Stuttgart, and mobile transmitters with the Twelfth Army Group, First, Seventh, Ninth and Fifteenth Armies.

# CHAPTER 4

## ARMY EDUCATION PROGRAM

### SECTION 1

### PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

115. One of the important lessons learned in the post armistice period of the last war was that men will not willingly accept military training when the fighting is over. This was vividly brought out in the now famous Fosdick reports to General Pershing and to the Secretary of War on morale in the American Expeditionary Force.[15] In these reports, Mr. Fosdick stressed the value to morale of athletics, recreation and education as opposed to purely military training. This was a primary reason for the Army's education program in World War II.

116. The Army's education program in this war, however, did not await the cessation of hostilities. It was recognized that men would have the opportunity to study in training and even during operations. The United States Armed Forces Institute was organized to serve these men. In theory, the service of the institute could be rapidly expanded to make available a fairly comprehensive program in the event of an unexpectedly sudden cessation of hostilities.

117. In the meantime, the Information and Education Divisions in the War Department and in the theaters of operations were charged with the planning of a broader education program.

### SECTION 2

### UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE

118. The United States Armed Forces Institute, known as USAFI, is a correspondence school service. Its headquarters are at Madison, Wisconsin. A branch was established in the United Kingdom in November 1943. Three types of courses were offered:

a. USAFI correspondence courses.

b. Self-teaching courses.

c. University extension courses.

These varied in price, the correspondence and self-teaching courses being furnished for the nominal sum of $2.

119. As of 30 November 1945, USAFI correspondence course enrollments totalled 84,307, self-teaching course enrollments 98,373, university extension course enrollments 3,382. As of 30 November 1945, 8,500 individuals had officially completed studies in the correspondence and self-teaching courses.[16]

120. By commercial correspondence school standards, USAFI's operations in the European Theater indicated a considerable success. The percentage of completed courses to 30 November 1945 is slightly higher than the commercial correspondence schools' average of completion.

121. USAFI's operation in the European Theater should have been even more successful than it was. Factors limiting the success were delays in shipment of requisitioned supplies from the Zone of the Interior, slowness in furnishing the soldier with his course and in the correction of his papers.

122. Both of these factors are capable of correction. The first is a matter of better planning in the selection of courses to be offered, the second a question of personnel - sufficient personnel to handle promptly the requests for courses, qualified military personnel to correct and grade the papers.

123. A development in the European Theater was the over-the-counter sale of USAFI self-teaching materials. Sub-branches located in the staging areas on the continent sold thousands of these courses to both officers and soldiers passing through.

## SECTION 3

## EDUCATION PROGRAM DURING OPERATIONS

124. In addition to the USAFI operations, the education program during operations in the European Theater included:

a. Language study.

b. Leave and furlough study with British universities and colleges.

c. The operation of a lecturers' bureau.

d. The organization and operation of the Army Information-Education Staff Schools, a training program for discussion group leaders, I and E officers, educational instructors and educational advisers.

e. The planning and preparation for the Army Education Program--Phase II (the post hostilities program).

## SECTION 4

## ARMY EDUCATION PROGRAM - POST HOSTILITIES

125. Planning for the program known as AEP--Phase II was begun in January 1944. In addition to the continuation of the USAFI operation, it was planned to establish:

a. Command schools, unit schools at the battalion level or its equivalent in strength, literacy classes, academic and vocational subjects.

b. A program of on-the-job training.

c. Army university centers, universities and centralized technical schools.

d. A program for training within civilian agencies.

e. An immediate program for the training of an estimated 20,000 key educational officers to be conducted by the Army Information-Education Staff Schools.

126. The plan was developed in collaboration with the Education Branch, Information and Education Division, War Department. It was estimated that AEP--Phase II in the European Theater of Operations would serve close to 2,000,000 soldiers.[17] On the basis of this estimate, 5,000,000 text books were allotted by the War Department to the European Theater.

127. Events since VE Day have proved that the selection of educational activities for AEP--Phase II was sound. The demand for USAFI materials increased substantially. Quotas for the army university centers, centralized technical school and training within civilian agencies programs have been consistently filled and could have been filled four to five times over. The command school and on-the-job training programs were popular with both commanders and soldiers.

128. A serious mistake, however, made in the planning of AEP--Phase II was the number of courses offered. These totalled 300. The actual demand was for less than 50. Of the 5,000,000 books made available for the education program in the European Theater, little more than 15% of the subjects were wanted. This, of course, developed shortages in the popular subjects. The actual shortage was not as serious as indicated, for larger quantities of the popular subjects had been provided than of the unpopular ones.

129. The quick ending of the war with Japan and the greatly accelerated rate of redeployment sharply checked the progress of the command school program. Schools instead of being opened were closed, or if opened were closed within a matter of days. It was not uncommon for a command school to have as many as 200 students one week and as few as two the next. Because of redeployment, instructors disappeared from units almost as quickly as did students. In the meantime, a lesson was being learned. Command schools at the battalion level were not economical. The most efficient were the schools at the division level, or in the Communications Zone at a comparable level,-- one school caring for as many as 100 units concentrated in a comparatively limited area. At the division level,

the school was adequately staffed and materials were used with far greater economy. Also, schools at this level were less seriously affected by redeployment.

130. The value of the Army Education Program--Phase II is difficult to measure. If measured against the original estimate of probable student participation, the program fell far short of success. For between 1 July 1945 and 1 January 1946, only 8% of the troops in the European Theater participated in the command school program, while less than 1½% participated in the army university centers, centralized technical school and training within civilian agencies programs.

131. If the Army Education Program--Phase II was designed to maintain the morale of troops, it might be asked, "What troops?", for 89% were unaffected by it.

132. If, on the other hand, the program may be judged on its value to those who participated in it, that value would prove very high, particularly in the case of the army university centers, the centralized technical school and the training within civilian agencies programs. These programs were extremely popular with students, many of whom claimed they had learned more in two months than in a year at college in the United States. The praise of 99% of the students was unqualified.

133. In the preparation period of the Army Education Program--Phase II, extreme difficulty was experienced in obtaining qualified administrative personnel. It was not until after VE Day that approval was given to the Information and Education Division to recruit the personnel needed. Because of this, the army university centers and the centralized technical school were delayed in their organization and operation. This was true of the training within civilian agencies program and the command school program. It must be appreciated that no education program can be ready for efficient operation at a given time unless personnel, facilities and materials are obtained and organized prior to that time.[17]

## CHAPTER 5

## RESEARCH

134. Research, as an I and E activity, was designed to ascertain the attitudes of troops towards factors affecting morale, and to collect and analyze data for Army agencies requesting research services.

135. In the European Theater of Operations, Research was first organized as a section of G-1, ETOUSA. The section was transferred to Special Services at the beginning of 1944. With the complete separation of the Information and Education Division from Special Services, Research was retained as an I and E activity.

136. The air forces employed Research in connection with problems of operational morale, the Chief Surgeon to ascertain the attitudes of casualties towards the medical service, the Quartermaster to study the attitudes of troops towards clothing, equipment and food, division commanders to test the fighting morale of their troops. Research served the reinforcement system. It served the Transportation Corps in connection with port operations. The Information and Education Division used it to test the value of its programs and to keep informed of the attitudes of troops towards the Allies, peoples of the liberated nations, the enemy, redeployment.

137. Research was the most efficiently operated of the I and E activities. The organization was composed of Army officers and civilians who were acknowledged leaders in their field.

138. Substantial as were its contributions to the ground, air and service forces, Research never played the vital role in the European Theater of Operations that it was capable of. Here was a useful tool for the theater commander, valuable not only to keep him regularly informed of the attitudes of troops towards morale factors, but to report to him on other problems requiring precise and impartial analysis of ascertainable facts.

## CHAPTER 6

## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### SECTION 1

### CONCLUSIONS

139. It is concluded:

a. That the Information and Education program in the European Theater of Operations was only partially effective, primarily because it was new to the officer corps and was not integrated into the military training program.

b. That of its six activities -- Stars and Stripes, Yank magazine, American Forces Network, Orientation, Education, Research -- only the last three, Orientation, Education and Research, logically belonged in the military training program.

c. That policy and procedures for I and E supplies were largely opportunistic and presented a continuous problem because of the fact that I and E was not a Supply Service yet attempted to operate as one.

## SECTION 2

## RECOMMENDATIONS

140. It is recommended:

a. That Orientation, Education and Research constitute the I and E program. That I and E be a section of G-3.

(1) That Orientation be made a part of military training and a responsibility of command.

(2) That the United States Armed Forces Institute be retained permanently in the Army as the basic organization for education, with an adequate branch set up in each theater of operations.

(3) That, at the discretion of the theater commander, Research be made available to major subordinate commands.

b. That I and E supplies be obtained through the appropriate established channels of supply.

c. That the Stars and Stripes, or an Army newspaper in an overseas theater, be operated independently of the I and E program and that the operation be placed directly under the theater commander.

d. That Yank magazine, or an Army magazine in an overseas theater, be made the responsibility for administration of the Adjutant General.

e. That the American Forces Network, or a radio entertainment service in an overseas theater, be made the responsibility of the Signal Corps.

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